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Article 6

On Restating Products Liability Preemption
Mary J. Davis†
The opportunity to reflect on the impact of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability1 since its adoption by the American
Law Institute in 1998 and its interaction with the ever-changing
preemption landscape is a fascinating one. Many have written on the
subject of federal preemption of products liability actions generally2 and
on the narrower subject of preemption by particular federal regulatory
action, whether by Congress directly or by an administrative agency.3 As
a way of framing the discussion at the symposium celebrating the 10th
Anniversary of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,
(“Products Liability Restatement”), our organizers asked the following
question: “Now that the Supreme Court has manifested a strong interest
in federal preemption of common law personal-injury doctrine, should
†

Stites & Harbison Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Administration and
Faculty Development, University of Kentucky College of Law. Many thanks to Professors Aaron
Twerski and Anita Bernstein for organizing this symposium to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, and for their products liability scholarship
generally which has so richly contributed to this field. Their insights and thoughtful comments on
the subject of preemption and products liability have been particularly valuable to me.
1
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. (1998).
2
See generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL
BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES (2008); Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law
by Federal Safety Statutes: Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. L.J.
913 (2004) (surveying Supreme Court preemption doctrine); Mary J. Davis, On Preemption,
Congressional Intent, and Conflict of Laws, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 181 (2004) (suggesting a conflict of
laws analysis for preemption problems); Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of
Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967 (2002) [hereinafter Davis, Unmasking the Presumption] (providing
an historical grounding in preemption cases and an introduction to the doctrine generally); Catherine
M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449
(2008) (discussing institutional competence issues in federal preemption by agency action). This list
is by no means intended to be exhaustive, but illustrates the richness of the scholarship in this area.
3
Most recently, the subject of preemption by the Federal Food and Drug
Administration’s actions has been a popular subject because it involves not express preemption but
implied preemption, which the Supreme Court has only addressed occasionally in recent years. The
Court has decided an implied preemption case this term in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009),
involving preemption of state common law failure-to-warn claims based on FDA-approved
pharmaceutical labeling. The Wyeth case and preemption by the FDA was the subject of lively
debate at the Products Liability Restatement 10th Anniversary Symposium. I thank the other panel
participants, Professor Robert Rabin, Malcolm Wheeler, and Sheila Birnbaum for the engaging
discussion. For my position on that issue, see Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption:
Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089 (2007) [hereinafter Davis, The Battle Over
Implied Preemption]. For other writing on that subject, see Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must
Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1
J. TORT LAW art. 5 (2006); Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the
Administrative State, 1 J. TORT LAW art. 4 (2006); Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort
Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIV. L. REV. 73 (2008).
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this topic (omitted in 1998) join the Restatement?” The Reporters of the
Products Liability Restatement correctly concluded, in section 4,
comment e, dealing with the effect of statutes and regulations on
liability, that, “The complex set of rules and standards for resolving
questions of federal preemption are beyond the scope of this
Restatement.”4 After almost two decades of struggle in the Supreme
Court over products liability preemption, the subject is still beyond the
scope of the Products Liability Restatement, or any Restatement project,
and is likely to be so for a while.
Many reasons exist for the continuing state of uncertainty in
preemption doctrine. Even though the Supreme Court has regularly
decided cases involving preemption of products liability actions since its
initial foray into the subject in 1992 in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,5
the Court’s keen interest in the subject has not resulted in a predictable
doctrinal approach.6 In addition, some have questioned the Supreme
Court’s motives in addressing the subject so frequently, causing many
observers to opine about the “politics of preemption,”7 which includes
concerns about the doctrine’s relationship to tort reform movements8 and
the tension, even among pro-preemption advocates, about unwarranted
federal intrusion into spheres of traditional state regulation as a matter of
respecting principles of federalism.9 Before Cipollone, the Supreme
Court had not decided a products liability preemption case and had only
rarely decided any case pitting state common law damages actions
against a federal regulatory scheme.10 Since Cipollone, the Court has
decided nine products liability preemption cases,11 the most recent the
4

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 4, cmt. e (1998).
505 U.S. 504 (1992).
6
See infra notes 49-72 and accompanying text.
7
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 229 (2000) (noting that “the politics of
preemption are complicated”).
8
MARGARET H. CLUNE, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, STEALTH TORT REFORM:
HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S AGGRESSIVE USE OF THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE HURTS
CONSUMERS 1 (2004), available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/preemption.pdf; see
also Terry Carter, The Pre-emption Prescription, 94 ABA J. 42, 46-47 (2008) (discussing the politics
surrounding pharmaceutical preemption decisions).
9
See, e.g., Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 969 (“[P]reemption is
about power and politics because it involves the fundamental balance of Congress’s power in
relation to the states. . . . To the extent that the Supreme Court has something to say about the power
struggle of federalism, it speaks, partially at least, through its preemption decisions.”); Nelson, supra
note 7, at 229; Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, § MM (Magazine), at
38; see also Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law
Products Liability Claims, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLL. 415, 417 & n.12 (2008) (noting that
preemption decisions regularly involve policy decisions and describing the policy preference model
of Supreme Court decision-making noted by political scientists).
10
See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 998.
11
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999
(2008); Warner-Lambert, Co. v. Kent, 126 S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (per curiam); Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002);
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861 (2000); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514
U.S. 280 (1995). In addition, the Court decided two cases involving preemption of state tort claims
5
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highly anticipated Wyeth v. Levine,12 involving implied preemption of
state law-based pharmaceutical failure-to-warn claims by the Federal
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) product labeling approval
decisions. The number of preemption decisions decided by the Court in
the last two decades that involved common law damages actions is
extraordinary, a record pace by any measure for a subject that had
received only scant attention during the prior century.13 Given the
Supreme Court’s continuing interest in the subject of preemption,14 the
relentless pursuit of preemption by regulated industries as a way to limit
liability exposure, and the variety of issues presented by the cases,15 the
continuing substantial uncertainty about the state of the doctrine counsels
against any attempt to restate it.
To state the black-letter law of federal preemption would, in
truth, be a fairly simple task.16 Preemption of state law stems from the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution17 which the Court
has long held requires an assessment of Congressional purpose.18 To that
end, the Court has defined express and implied preemption doctrines.
Express preemption exists when a statutory provision provides the scope
of Congress’ intent to preempt, and its scope must be evaluated through
an assessment of the statutory language, its structure, and, there is
disagreement here, its purpose as discerned through the legislative
history.19 Implied preemption doctrines substitute for Congress’ express
intent to preempt a judicial determination that Congress would have
wanted federal laws to govern when state laws create an actual conflict
with federal objectives or make it impossible to comply with both federal
by the Federal Railroad Safety Act, Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (1999),
and CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993), and two cases involving
preemption of state regulation under the federal cigarette labeling laws, Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,
129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) (no express preemption of state fraud-based consumer protection litigation),
and Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (state cigarette advertising regulations
expressly preempted).
12
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). For a discussion of Wyeth, see supra notes
113-128 and accompanying text.
13
See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 998.
14
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1441, 1442 (2008) (“In short, there are few topics relating the Supreme Court’s statutory
jurisprudence that are as important as agency inputs into preemption decisions, and none that are
more important.”).
15
From whether state consumer trade regulations are preempted by express preemption
provisions, see Altria Group, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 538, to whether product-specific labeling decisions
impliedly preempt common law claims, see Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187, it is clear that aggressive
preemption arguments can continue to be expected.
16
See, e.g., DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 14.4 (2d ed. 2008).
17
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“The Constitution, and laws of the United states which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . . . ”).
18
See Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (stating that “the purpose
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone” in preemption analysis).
19
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). For the continuing
debate on these seemingly straightforward principles, see Altria Group, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 538 and the
debate between the majority opinion of Justice Stevens and the dissenting opinion of Justice
Thomas. Altria Group, Inc. is discussed infra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
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and state obligations.20 Implementing implied preemption doctrines
often requires judges to cut at the joint between overlapping federal
objectives and important state prerogatives and, therefore, is a sensitive
inquiry. A variety of factors has been important to the Court’s implied
preemption doctrine over the years21 and it might be possible to “restate”
those in a catalogue-type way if one were so inclined.22
Our symposium organizers likely asked the framing question
rhetorically, however, understanding that the debate over preemption of
products liability personal injury actions is about much more than the
doctrine itself. It provides a much broader canvas than that. Rather, it
provides the opportunity to examine a number of considerations that are
not directly related to the details of preemption doctrine or whether that
doctrine is ready to be “restated” in the American Law Institute way.
That is why this opportunity is such a fascinating one.
The considerations to which I refer are both doctrinal and
normative. They relate to the way preemption doctrine has evolved in the
past two decades and to the question of whether the current trend in
preemption doctrine, toward increased preemption of state common law
personal injury actions, strikes the right balance between federal interests
in certainty and uniformity of regulation and the interests of those
harmed by the unrelenting risks produced by some regulated industries.
The Supreme Court’s own struggle over this balance supports a narrow
vision of preemption doctrine. I also suggest that to restate preemption
doctrine that codifies a rule that places the risk of uncertainty on the
future victim of that risk, absent unquestionable congressional intent to
do so, or clear, focused analysis that openly takes those victims’ interests
into account, does not strike that balance appropriately.
This Article provides a brief explanation of the state of
preemption doctrine and explains how the Court altered, quite
dramatically, its treatment of preemption of common law tort actions in
the last two decades. The Court’s almost exclusive focus on the
interpretation of express preemption provisions, which never specifically
address common law tort claims one way or the other, turned
“traditional” preemption analysis of common law tort claims on its head.
The Court then, almost as suddenly, signaled a retreat from the emphasis
on express preemption analysis and returned, awkwardly, to implied
preemption doctrine.23 The Court has only recently begun meaningful

20

See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516-17.
See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 1013-14.
22
See, e.g., Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption, supra note 3, at 1138-51
(applying identified factors in implied conflict preemption to failure-to-warn claims involving
pharmaceuticals).
23
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884 (2000). The Court had
foreshadowed this result in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288-89 (1995). For a
discussion of Geier, see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
21
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modern analysis of implied preemption,24 particularly with its decisions
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.25 and Wyeth v. Levine,26 and that
doctrine will require years of fleshing out by the Court’s current
members.27 After describing the current, uneasy state of preemption
doctrine, this Article will provide a few observations about the normative
inquiry regarding what preemption doctrine should, and should not, be
accomplishing.
The effort to identify congressional intent to preempt has always
been central to the preemption inquiry. As mentioned earlier, under the
command of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,28 the Court has
obligated itself to identify and follow the “clear and manifest purpose of
Congress”29 to assess the preemptive scope of federal legislation. It must
be remembered that before Cipollone in 1992, the Court had only rarely
found common law tort claims to be contained within the scope of any
express preemption provision, much less had it found such claims
impliedly preempted.30 With its opinion in Cipollone, the Court began in
earnest to shift the focus on determining congressional intent by
inquiring into the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms of express
preemption provisions.31
Cipollone is an example of the difficulty of that inquiry as it
applies to common law tort claims. The case involved the question of
whether the preemption provision of the federal cigarette labeling laws,
the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act of 1965, as amended by the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,32 preempted tort claims arising
out of cigarette smoking-related health problems.33 Neither statute
24

Geier, 529 U.S. 861, and Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002), both
involved express preemption provisions that the Court concluded did not preempt the claims in issue
and implied conflict preemption analyses which supported preemption in Geier but not in Sprietsma.
See infra notes 55-59, 69-71 and accompanying text; see also Davis, The Battle Over Implied
Preemption, supra note 3, at 1124-27, 1129-30.
25
529 U.S. 861 (2000).
26
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
27
Indeed, watching how the Justices line up on the preemption scorecard has been
somewhat of a pastime for many observers of preemption jurisprudence. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra
note 9, at 419, 428-29 (discussing the unusual 8-to-1 decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
999 (2008), involving Medical Device Amendments preemption). After attempting to predict how
the Court would answer the Federal Boat Safety Act preemption question in Sprietsma v. Mercury
Marine, I have given up on prognosticating where preemption is concerned. See Davis, Unmasking
the Presumption, supra note 2, at 1025-28.
28
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For a thorough analysis of the history of this provision and
its meaning in historical context, see Nelson, supra note 7, at 232-64.
29
Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Malone v. White Motor
Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (congressional intent is “the ultimate touchstone” of preemption
analysis (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))).
30
See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 998.
31
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (stating that express
preemption controls when it provides “reliable indicium of congressional intent” to be discerned by
interpretation of statutory language (quoting Malone, 435 U.S. at 505)).
32
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2006); Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 514-15.
33
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 508-09.
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specifically mentioned common law damages claims, but rather stated,
respectively, that the states may not impose any “statement” or
“requirement or prohibition” “relating to smoking and health” in
cigarette packaging or advertising.34 All the Justices in Cipollone agreed
that the preemption analysis should proceed by an interpretation of the
scope of the express preemption provision,35 but that is where the
agreement ended.
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Stevens,36 summarized
the state of preemption doctrine and then engaged in a “fair[] but . . .
narrow[]” interpretation of the provisions in issue with sensitivity to the
presumption against preemption where matters historically within the
police powers of the state are involved.37 The majority concluded,
therefore, that the 1965 Act did not preempt any common law tort
actions.38 A plurality of Justices then concluded that the 1969 Act’s
language, preempting state law “requirements or prohibitions,”
preempted some but not all of the claims.39 Even the plurality was not
entirely true to the task of fair but narrow statutory interpretation based
on the presumption against preemption: the plurality found that the 1969
Act preempted some claims because of the change in the preemption
provision’s language, even though Congress specifically stated in the
legislative history of the 1969 Act that it did not intend to alter the scope
of the preemption provision from its previous version.40
Three concurring Justices found no express preemption at all,
resting on the premise that common law damages actions have at most an
indirect regulatory effect and, therefore, do not impose either
requirements or prohibitions inconsistent with Congress’ intent.41 Justice
Blackmun, speaking for this group, recognized the Court’s long tradition
of declining “to find the regulatory effects of state tort law direct or

34

Id. at 514-15 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1334).
See id. at 516; id. at 531 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
545-46 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36
Justice Stevens has authored many of the Court’s preemption opinions including, in
addition to Cipollone, the opinions of the Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996),
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002), Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431
(2005), and, most recently, Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008), which confirms the
viability of the plurality opinion’s analysis in Cipollone.
37
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518, 523 (plurality opinion).
38
Id. at 519-20.
39
Id. at 521.
40
Id. (“The phrase ‘[n]o requirement or prohibition’ sweeps broadly and suggests no
distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the contrary, those words easily
encompass obligations that take the form of common-law rules.”) (quoting Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006)). The plurality opinion found partial preemption
of those damages actions whose predicate is a “requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health.” Id. at 524. The Court dismissed Congress’ statement in the legislative history regarding no
intended change in scope of the preemption provision as inconsistent with the plain meaning of the
statute’s language. Id. at 520-21 & n.19.
41
Id. at 535-36 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35
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substantial enough to warrant pre-emption.”42 The two remaining
Justices, Scalia and Thomas, found complete preemption based on the
“apparent meaning” of the same words.43 So, the stage was set for
decades of confusing express preemption analysis and relentless
arguments that Congress intended words like “requirements” to include
common law damages actions.
The Cipollone court also addressed the presumption against
preemption of state law in areas involving the historic police powers of
the state, including matters of public health and safety.44 The Court
disagreed about the presumption then, and continues to disagree about
it.45 The Cipollone plurality said that express preemption provisions
should be fairly but narrowly interpreted, being informed by an
understanding of the value of the long tradition of tort law that
complemented federal regulation of public health and safety.46 That
understanding reflected the federalism balance struck by historical
preemption jurisprudence over the previous seventy years.47 Implied
preemption played no role in Cipollone, though the Court had
emphasized implied preemption analysis in its discussion of preemption
of common law damages actions throughout history.48
The Court’s post-Cipollone opinions have been similarly
fractured, though in differing ways. First, the Court has continued to
struggle with determining the scope of express preemption provisions.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,49 involving the Medical Device Amendments to
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, is another example of the
Court’s struggle with express preemption principles.50 In Lohr, the
42

Id. at 537.
Id. at 544 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia’s dissent
figures prominently in Justice Thomas’ dissent in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 551
(2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting), discussed infra note 110 and accompanying text.
44
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518. For a fuller discussion of the “presumption against
preemption,” see Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2.
45
See Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption, supra note 3, at 1132-34; Davis,
Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 1013-14.
46
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.
47
See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 972-97.
48
See id.
49
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 US. 470 (1996).
50
The preemption provision of the MDA, added to the FDCA in 1976 and at issue in
Lohr, stated that states may not impose “requirement[s] . . . different from or in addition to” any
federal requirement “relate[d] to safety or effectiveness.” 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). The three
opinions in Lohr revisited the disagreement begun in Cipollone over whether “requirement” was
intended to mean common law damages actions and how express preemption provisions were to be
read, whether neutrally or with an understanding of the presumption against preemption in the case
of historic state police powers. See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 1002-04.
Five justices found that the provision did not preempt any claims against the medical device
manufacturer, with Justice Breyer’s concurrence being critical to the holding. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 503
(Breyer, J., concurring). He suggested that common law damages actions could be requirements, but
they were not intended to be so based on the preemption provision’s language and the FDA’s
regulation implementing the provision. Id. at 503-04. For additional discussion of Lohr and MDA
preemption, see Richard C. Ausness, “After you, My Dear Alphonse!”: Should the Courts Defer to
43
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manufacturers of a medical device that had been approved under a
grandfathering method known as pre-market notification argued that the
MDA’s preemption provision preempted common law tort claims based
on alleged defects in the device’s design, warning, and manufacture.51
The Court was again divided on the meaning of the term “requirements,”
with a plurality considering that it did not preempt the claims in issue
under a narrow interpretation of the statute and its implementing
regulations,52 but a majority, four in dissent and one concurring in the
result, disagreed.53
With such disagreement, it is no wonder that commentators
opined that Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr was a “veiled implied preemption
analysis”54 in express preemption clothing, because the Justices
continued to debate whether Congress intended to include common law
damages actions within the meaning of the term “requirement.” Those
commentators might be called prescient. Four years later in Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co.,55 the Court found that an express
preemption provision, arguably clearer than that involved in Lohr, which
prohibited state “standards” that were not identical to the statutorilydefined minimum federal standards in issue, did not expressly preempt a
design defect claim based on failure to include an air bag, but that
implied conflict preemption principles did bar the claim.56 This result is
even more remarkable given that the legislation in issue, the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA),57 contains a savings
clause, which states that compliance with a federal standard “does not
exempt a person from liability at common law.”58 The majority opinion
in Geier said nothing about the presumption against preemption nor did
it engage in a particularly meaningful evaluation of the actual terms of
the express preemption provision, as one would have expected after
Cipollone and Lohr.59

the FDA’s New Interpretation of § 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments?, 80 TUL. L. REV.
727, 767-75 (2006); Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 1002-04.
51
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 480-83.
52
Id. at 492-94.
53
Id. at 508 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 509
(O’Connor, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54
See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 1004.
55
529 U.S. 861 (2000).
56
Id. at 865-87.
57
The NTMVSA of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988) (repealed 1994), is currently
codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (2000).
58
15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988). I am delighted to have been able to discuss Geier with
Malcolm Wheeler, Wheeler Trigg Kennedy LLP, at the symposium. Malcolm successfully argued
Geier for the defendants. I happen to agree with the dissent in Geier that neither express nor implied
preemption were justified. Geier, 529 U.S. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Ralph
Nader & Joseph A. Page, Automobile-Design Liability and Compliance with Federal Standards, 64
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 415 (1996) (arguing against preemption under NTMVSA).
59
See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 1006-07.
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The implied preemption analysis from Geier is an important
modern exploration by the Court of implied conflict preemption and for
that reason is likely to be very influential going forward.60 The Court did
not discuss the presumption against preemption per se61 but did identify
features of the air bag regulatory scheme and its history that informed the
assessment of actual conflict. The Court reviewed a wide range of factors
in determining actual conflict: the history of the regulation, the views of
the various Secretaries of Transportation on the objectives of the
standard, as well as the published comments to the various versions of
the standard.62 The obvious effort by Department of Transportation
officials to balance the interests of the regulated industry and the
consuming public during the evolution of the standard influenced the
Court in its determination that state tort laws would have an
impermissible impact on the implementation of those objectives.63 The
Court also discussed the relevance of the Secretary’s position on
preemption and how much weight to place on the Department of
Transportation’s assessment of conflict.64 The lack of a formal statement
on preemption was not determinative, though the Court seemed uneasy
about how to treat less-than-formal expressions of agency position.65
In the eight years between Cipollone and Geier, then, the Court’s
preemption doctrine stood on shifting sand. With every new case, the
Court resisted discussing the “presumption against preemption” and
struggled with how to balance the historic role of state tort law in
regulating product safety. Subsequent cases continued to reflect that
conflict. In Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal Committee,66 the Court
conducted an implied preemption analysis under the Medical Device
Amendments, after quickly concluding that the plaintiff’s fraud-on-theFDA claims were not expressly preempted.67 Because policing fraud on a
federal agency was uniquely federal and not traditionally governed by
the states, the Court concluded that the presumption against preemption

60

See Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption, supra note 3, at 1124-27. The Court
discussed Geier at length in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), in applying implied
preemption principles to the pharmaceutical labeling claims involved there. The FDCA does not
have an express preemption provision related to its pharmaceutical approval provisions. See Wyeth,
129 S. Ct. at 1195-96 (discussing history of FDCA and noting that Congress did not include an
express preemption provision for pharmaceutical approvals when it added the express preemption
provision in the Medical Device Amendments in 1976); see also Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp.,
172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1035 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (explaining that the portion of FDCA dealing with
pharmaceuticals does not contain a preemption provision).
61
Geier, 529 U.S. at 869-72; see also id. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62
Id. at 877-85.
63
Id. at 882-83. For a more elaborate discussion of the Geier implied conflict preemption
analysis, see Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption, supra note 3, at 1124-27.
64
Geier, 529 U.S. at 883.
65
Id. at 884-85.
66
531 U.S. 341 (2001).
67
Id. at 347-48.
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did not operate and that the state-law based claims were preempted.68 In
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,69 the Court similarly concluded that the
Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 did not expressly preempt design defect
claims based on a failure to equip a recreational vessel with a propeller
guard even though the Coast Guard had studied the matter and declined
to require the guards.70 The Court also found no implied preemption
because the Coast Guard regulations preserved state authority in the
absence of federal action, and the Coast Guard previously had been in
favor of permitting state common law claims.71 The Court in Sprietsma
unanimously concluded that the more prominent safety objective in the
federal statutory scheme justified maintaining complementary common
law remedies.72 The unanimity was remarkable in itself for a subject
about which the Court had been so fractured.
At this point, it would be well to highlight the importance of
federal agency position on preemption analysis.73 One of the main issues
in preemption analysis present in virtually every case, except Cipollone,
is how much weight to give the relevant federal agency’s position on the
matter. An agency position articulating the federal objectives at stake and
assessing whether those objectives preempt state tort claims might
properly inform the preemption analysis as a substitute for congressional
intent when determining whether an actual conflict exists. The Court has
recognized the need, in some cases, to defer to agency interpretations of
statutes and administrative regulations, but whether to defer to agency
position on preemption of state common law has proved more
troublesome. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, involved an FDA regulation
implementing the statutory preemption provision; the majority opinion
was “substantially informed” by that regulation because it had been
formally adopted and because of the agency’s “unique role” enforcing
the statute.74 Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., “place[d] some
weight” on the position of the Department of Transportation, DOT, in
favor of preemption, but did not defer to it.75 The Court in Sprietsma, as
just mentioned, was heavily influenced by the Coast Guard’s position
68

Id.
537 U.S. 51 (2002).
70
Id. at 59-60.
71
Id. at 64-66. Like the NTMVSA, the FBSA had both an express preemption provision
and a savings clause. Id. at 62-63 (applying 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (2000)).
72
Id. at 69-70.
73
Many have discussed the importance of agency position in preemption analysis. See
generally Eskridge, supra note 14; Nina Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV.
737 (2004); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007); see also Ausness, supra note 50, at
767-75.
74
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495-96 (1996). Justice Breyer concurred,
agreeing that “the relevant administrative agency possesse[d] a degree of leeway to determine which
rules, regulations, or other administrative actions will have pre-emptive effect.” Id. at 505-06
(Breyer, J., concurring).
75
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881-83 (2000).
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against preemption. The importance of agency position on preemption,
and the uncertainty regarding the Court’s position on the matter, has
compounded the uneasiness of preemption analysis.
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC76 offered hope that stability
might have come to the Court’s express preemption analysis. The Court
was presented with an express preemption provision, this time from the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).77 The
Court, speaking through Justice Stevens, made some important general
observations about the delicate balance that must be achieved in
determining the scope of such provisions, and about the effect of shifting
agency position on preemption analysis. First, the Court gave an
uncharacteristic endorsement of the longstanding value of tort law as a
catalyst in the effort to enhance public safety.78 I say “uncharacteristic”
because the Court’s opinions had most recently failed even to discuss the
presumption against preemption, much less the value of tort law in
enhancing public safety.79 The Court employed the narrow express
preemption analysis it described in Cipollone, specifically rejecting the
conclusion that common law jury verdicts are the equivalent of
“requirements” simply because they may influence decision-making.80
The Court also rejected as irrelevant speculation over whether a jury
verdict might affect a manufacturer’s conduct,81 and described the proper
inquiry as an examination of the predicate “common-law dut[ies] in
issue” to determine whether Congress intended that they be preempted.82
The Court concluded that the express preemption provision
preempted very few claims.83 The Court reiterated its adherence to the
presumption against preemption because tort litigation “provid[es] an
incentive to manufacturers to use the utmost care in the business of
distributing inherently dangerous items.”84 The Court also expressed a
sense of frustration at the way the lower courts had broadly read the term
76

544 U.S. 431 (2005).
7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006).
78
Bates, 544 U.S. at 449-51.
79
Id. at 441. The Court also observed that it was not until Cipollone that preemption
arguments based on the notion that “requirements” includes common law tort claims began to flood
the courts. Id.
80
Id. at 445.
81
Id. (“This effects-based test finds no support in the text of § 136v(b), which speaks
only of requirements. A requirement is a rule of law that must be obeyed; an event, such as a jury
verdict, that merely motivates an optional decision is not a requirement.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
82
Id. (“The inducement test is unquestionably overbroad . . . .”).
83
Id. at 451-52.
84
Id. at 449; see also id. at 459 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Today’s decision thus comports with this Court’s increasing reluctance to expand federal statutes
beyond their terms through doctrines of implied preemption. This reluctance reflects that preemption
analysis is not [a] freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal
objectives, . . . but an inquiry into whether the ordinary meanings of state and federal law conflict.”)
(citations omitted) (also endorsing a narrow view of cases in which implied preemption is
permitted).
77
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“requirements” after Cipollone, and chastised the “too quick
conclusion”85 that claims were also, therefore, preempted under FIFRA.
Bates also raised the importance of agency position on
preemption. The regulating agency, the Environmental Protection
Agency, had shifted its position on preemption in the previous five years
from being against it to being for it.86 The Court was not influenced by
that shift in position.87 Rather, the Court noted that “if Congress had
intended to [prevent the operation] of a long available form of
compensation, it surely would have expressed that intent more clearly.”88
The Court endorsed the notion that common law tort claims, enforced by
private parties, “would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of
FIFRA . . . [which] contemplates that pesticide labels will evolve over
time, as manufacturers gain more information about their products’
performance in diverse settings . . . [T]ort suits can serve as a catalyst in
this process.”89 The concern expressed by the defendant and the EPA
that “tort suits led to a ‘crazy-quilt’ of FIFRA standards or otherwise
created a real hardship for manufacturers” fell on deaf ears, as the Court
observed that “for much of this period EPA appears to have welcomed
these tort suits.”90 The Court’s skepticism about the sincerity of agency
position on preemption after such a shift is palpable.
By 2005, one could fairly describe the Court’s preemption
personality as a bit Jekyll-and-Hyde-like. Which analysis will apply,
express or implied preemption? If express preemption analysis applies,
will it be fair but narrow, or something else? Does a presumption against
preemption exist or not? What is the role of agency position on
preemption? Even with such open questions, I might have suggested that
federal preemption doctrine was approaching stasis. After Bates, it
looked as if express preemption analysis was taking a more certain
shape, and, after Geier and Sprietsma, that implied preemption had the
same potential. But in its 2007-08 term, in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,91 by
finding express preemption under the Medical Device Amendments for
devices that satisfied the pre-market approval process, the Court again
reflected an aggressive pro-preemption inclination in spite of Sprietsma
and Bates.92 Some observers describe Riegel as a fairly narrow
application of the MDA express preemption provision and a logical
extension of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.93 As to the application of the MDA
preemption provision to the pre-market approval process, that may be so.
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Bates, 544 U.S. at 446 (majority opinion).
Id. at 436-37 & n.7, 449.
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 451-52.
128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
Id. at 1006-11.
See Sharkey, supra note 9, at 415 nn.3-4.
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The Court’s language, however, is gratuitous in its criticism of the role of
common law tort claims and expansive in its description of the scope of
express preemption where it had not been before.
There are several reasons that I consider Riegel to be an
unwarranted extension of preemption doctrine, and these reasons support
my position that the time has not come to “restate” products liability
preemption doctrine. First, Riegel purports to be yet another statement on
how to read express preemption provisions, but it is much broader than
its predecessors. It is an example of the bankruptcy of the idea that
express preemption analysis is a search for the clear and manifest intent
of Congress. In interpreting, now for the second time, the MDA express
preemption provision which preempts state “requirements” different
from or in addition to those required by federal regulations, there is little
discussion of Congress’ intent. The Court’s discussion of the issue in
Lohr had been badly fractured and so Riegel provided an opportunity to
explore and clarify the matter. Instead, the Court failed to continue the
dialogue begun in Lohr about the regulatory effect of common law
damages actions within the structure of the MDA.94 I realize that some
members of the Court are reluctant to explore legislative purposes and
history in statutory interpretation, but even under an “apparent” meaning
analysis, the Court could have explored what Congress’ intent was in this
regard, as it had in prior cases. The Court appears committed to the
position that “requirements” includes common law tort claims, so I will
not tarry too long expressing my disagreement with this conclusion. I
will, however, direct all readers to Justice Ginsburg’s persuasive dissent
in Riegel on this point.95
In lieu of an analysis of congressional intent as the touchstone of
preemption analysis, the Court states: “Congress is entitled to know what
meaning this Court will assign to terms regularly used in its enactments.
Absent other indication, reference to a State’s ‘requirements’ includes its
common-law duties.”96 Of course, the MDA was written in 1976 long
before the Court’s current dictionary of definitions was taking shape.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the Court’s pronouncement, which was
joined by eight Justices, stands in stark contrast to the decision in Bates,
just three years earlier, that was significantly more circumspect on the
meaning of the term “requirement.” One is left to wonder what meaning

94

Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1007-08. Instead, the Court explains its conclusion about what
“requirements” means from its own discussion of the term, in Bates involving a statute written in the
1940s, and in Cipollone involving statutes written in the 1960s. Id.
95
Id. at 1013 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, the author of Cipollone,
Medtronic, Inc., Sprietsma, and Bates, concurred on the scope of “requirements” because it is
consistent with the result in Medtronic, Inc. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1011-13 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Prof. Rabin’s remarks on this topic at the symposium are
relevant as well. See Robert L. Rabin, Territorial Claims in the Domain of Accidental Harm:
Conflicting Conceptions of Tort Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 987 (2009).
96
Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008.
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words will have ten, twenty, or thirty years from now, shorn of their
connection either to ordinary meaning or congressional intent.
Second, while defining the “normal meaning” of the term
“requirement” for future congresses, the Court displayed its contempt for
common law tort actions. According to the Riegel court, tort law as
applied by juries is simply unfit to regulate. It is “less deserving of
preservation” than other state regulations.97 Juries are incapable of
balancing costs and benefits adequately as they “see[] only the costs of a
more dangerous design, and [are] not concerned with [the] benefits”
consumers reap by the manufacturer’s design choices.98 It is
“implausible,” according to the Court, that Congress would create the
“perverse distinction” that grants greater power to a single state jury than
to state officials.99 Whether one agrees or disagrees with these remarks,
there is certainly little, if anything, left of the historic place that state tort
law held in regulating public safety in them, and certainly little in
common with Justice Stevens’ remarks on that score in Bates. Such
comments also seem to have no place in an opinion analyzing the
meaning of a term used by a Congress, writing in 1976, in response to
the design and warning labeling failures of the medical device industry
which had prompted enactment of the legislation.100 Remarks such as
these also give credence to the criticism that the Court is taking a
political and policy position in its preemption doctrine, rendering its
opinions unnecessarily activist.
Third, the Riegel court discusses, at some length, the effect of the
FDA’s changing position on preemption, even though it acknowledged
that the position was not relevant to the case because the statutory
language was clear.101 The FDA had recently changed its position on the
scope of the MDA preemption provision as it applied to the pre-market
approval process.102 It has also done so in a high-profile way in the
pharmaceutical labeling implied preemption cases.103 While largely dicta,
the Court’s statements displayed some sympathy for the proposition that
recent agency position may be relevant to an assessment of current
preemptive scope, despite longstanding contrary agency position.104
Some of the Court’s earlier pronouncements on this matter differ from its
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Id.
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 1003; see also id. at 1014-15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (chronicling the history
of the MDA and the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device litigation which prompted it).
101
Id. at 1009 (majority opinion).
102
Id.
103
See Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption, supra note 3, at 1108-11.
104
Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009 (“But of course, the agency’s earlier position . . . is even
more compromised, indeed deprived of all claim to deference, by the fact that it is no longer the
agency’s position.”).
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discussion in Riegel.105 Both opinions in Riegel recognize the centrality
of the issue to implied preemption doctrine, and to the pharmaceutical
labeling case of Wyeth v. Levine in particular.106
Riegel does not display the search for balance in preemption
doctrine reflected in the Court’s other opinions. The respect for the
traditional longstanding role of the common law is absent. Express
preemption doctrine has some semblance of predictability and stability
though that predictability is not sufficiently connected to congressional
intent as it is supposed to be. An example of this disconnect in express
preemption analysis may be found in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,107
decided after Riegel and which involved whether the plurality opinion in
Cipollone, defining the claims that survived express preemption under
the cigarette labeling laws, had continuing validity after the ensuing
sixteen years of preemption doctrine.108 I would have expected, after
Riegel and its 8-to-1 opinion in favor (in dicta, at least) of a more
expansive reading of express preemption provisions, that Justice
Stevens’ plurality opinion in Cipollone was destined for extinction, but I
would have been wrong. In what can only be described as a stunning turn
of events in preemption doctrine, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Souter, held that the plurality opinion of
Cipollone does, indeed, control the express preemption analysis of that
statute.109 The majority opinion rejected the broader scope of preemption
analysis proposed by Justice Scalia in Cipollone, and advocated in Altria
Group by Justice Thomas for the dissent,110 stating, “Justice Scalia’s
approach was rejected by seven Members of the Court, and in the almost
17 years since Cipollone was decided Congress has done nothing to
indicate its approval of that approach.”111 Justice Stevens returned in
Altria Group to his opinion in Bates and endorsed the presumption
against preemption and a fair but narrow reading of the scope of express
preemption.112 One is also left to wonder what to make of the continuing
validity of the definition of the term “requirements,” fashioned by the
majority opinion in Riegel.
As if the Court’s recent flurry of preemption decisions was not
enough to digest, the Court agreed to decide in its 2008-09 term an
implied preemption case involving claims challenging the adequacy of
105

See discussion of Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, supra notes 76-88 and
accompanying text; see also Sharkey, supra note 9, at 423.
106
Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009; id. at 1017-19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
107
129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
108
Id. at 541-42.
109
Id. at 549 (“In sum, we conclude now, as the plurality did in Cipollone, that ‘the
phrase “based on smoking and health” fairly but narrowly construed does not encompass the more
general duty not to make fraudulent statements.’” (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S.
504, 529 (1992)).
110
Id. at 545 n.7; see id. at 552-54 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
111
Id. at 545 n.7 (majority opinion).
112
See id. at 543.
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federally approved pharmaceutical labeling, Wyeth v. Levine.113 The
FDA’s high profile change in position in favor of preemption of common
law tort claims based on its labeling approval decisions began to make its
way into briefs on the issue in 2004.114 Many lower courts had struggled
with implied preemption doctrine in these cases, and what to make of the
FDA’s recent position shift in that analysis.115 The FDA also described
that shift in a very controversial discussion in the preamble to a 2006
pharmaceutical labeling regulation.116 After Riegel and the open debate
between Justice Scalia in the majority and Justice Ginsburg in dissent
over the scope of implied preemption in pharmaceutical labeling cases
and the relevance of agency position on preemption, many observers,
including several at the symposium, expected the Court to find a narrow
ground on which to preempt the claims in issue in Wyeth. But, again, the
Court’s preemption decisions defy prediction. The Court, speaking
through Justice Stevens with a six-to-three majority, found that the
FDA’s product labeling approvals did not impliedly preempt Levine’s
tort claims.117
Wyeth involved the anti-nausea drug Phenergan which was
approved in 1955.118 Ms. Levine had been injected with the drug to
alleviate symptoms from a migraine headache and, through inadvertent
injection into an artery, gangrene, a known side effect, resulted and her
arm eventually had to be amputated.119 Wyeth knew about the risk of
intra-arterial injection, had warned about it in a section of the labeling,
and that labeling had been approved over the years by the FDA.120 Ms.
Levine claimed that the labeling inadequately warned of the risk of
gangrene, and the jury agreed.121 The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a
lower court ruling that Ms. Levine’s claims were not impliedly
preempted by the FDA’s labeling approvals.122
Wyeth made two separate preemption arguments: first that it
would have been impossible for it to comply with the state law duty to
warn without violating federal law.123 Wyeth argued that it would have
been a violation of federal regulations to alter the Phenergan label
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129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
See Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption, supra note 2, at 1090.
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See, e.g., Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, No. 08-437,
2009 WL 578682 (Mar. 9, 2009); Tucker v. SmithKline Beecham, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (S.D. Ind.
2008); Knipe v. SmithKline Beecham, 583 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
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Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3922, 3934 (Jan. 18, 2006).
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Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191.
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Id. at 1192.
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Id. at 1192.
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Id. at 1192-93.
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without first obtaining FDA approval.124 The Court disagreed after a
thorough exploration of the labeling approval regulations which
permitted pharmaceutical manufacturers to alter product labels to add or
strengthen a warning.125 Implied conflict preemption based on the
impossibility of complying with both federal and state law has only
rarely been applied, and the Court rejected it in this instance, too.126 The
Court noted that impossibility preemption is “a demanding defense”127
and that it would require “clear evidence” of impossibility to succeed.128
This guidance on implied conflict preemption involving arguments of
impossibility will be a welcome addition to the Court’s jurisprudence in
this area.
Of greater importance, however, is the Court’s discussion of
general implied preemption principles relating to obstacle conflict
preemption. Borrowing from the analysis in Geier which supported
implied conflict preemption, Wyeth had argued that plaintiff’s tort claims
are preempted because “they interfere with ‘Congress’s purpose to
entrust an expert agency to make drug labeling decisions that strike a
balance between competing objectives,’”129 and that set both a floor and a
ceiling for drug regulation.130 The Court emphatically rejected these
arguments, noting they rely on an “untenable interpretation” of
congressional intent and “an overbroad view” of an agency’s power to
preempt state law.131
After Riegel, the Court could not have been expected to so
boldly embrace the regulatory value of state tort law, but it did,
reiterating adherence to the presumption against preemption.132 It
explored congressional purposes behind the labeling provisions by
reviewing how the history of those provisions illuminated Congress’
attitude toward complementary state tort litigation. The Court concluded
that, “If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its
objectives, it surely would have enacted an express preemption provision
at some point during the FDCA’s 70-year history.”133 Adding to its
conclusion that Congress did not consider state tort law to be an obstacle
124

See id. at 1197.
Id. at 1196-97.
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Id. at 1196-99.
127
Id. at 1199.
128
Id. at 1198 (“But absent clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a
change to Phenergan’s label, we will not conclude that it was impossible for Wyeth to comply with
both federal and state requirement.”).
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Id. at 1199 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 46, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187
(2009) (No. 06-1249)).
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Id.
131
Id.
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Id. at 1194-95; see also id. at 1195 n.3 (“We rely on the presumption because respect
for the States as ‘independent sovereigns in our federal system’ leads us to assume that ‘Congress
does not cavalierly preempt state-law causes of action.” (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 485 (1996))).
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to achieving federal objectives in the area of pharmaceutical labeling, the
Court rejected as irrelevant the FDA’s “mere assertion” that state law
poses an obstacle.134 Finding this position at odds with the available
evidence of Congress’ purposes, the Court explored the many ways that
tort law acts as a complementary form of drug regulation.135
After the discussion in Riegel about the negative impact that tort
verdicts have on regulated industries, the discussion in Wyeth seems to
be coming from an entirely different court. Compare the following
language from Wyeth with earlier remarks from Riegel:
State tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and provide incentives for
drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly. They also serve a distinct
compensatory function that may motivate injured persons to come forward with
information. Failure-to-warn actions, in particular lend force to the FDCA’s
premise that manufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary responsibility for their
drug labeling at all times.136

These comments sound like those of Justice Stevens in Bates and are a
welcome return to greater balance between the role of state tort law and
the need to give federal regulation the breathing room that Congress
intended, but no more.
Finally, because Wyeth had relied on Geier for many of its
implied preemption arguments, the Court distinguished Geier by noting
the significant differences in the two regulatory schemes.137 Geier
involved a formal agency rule-making with a contemporaneous plan to
implement the defined objectives.138 Wyeth did not. On this point, Justice
Breyer noted in concurrence that “it is also possible that state tort law
will sometimes interfere with the FDA’s desire to create a drug label
containing a specific set of cautions and instructions”139 similar to the
regulation in Geier, an opinion authored by Justice Breyer. The future of
implied obstacle preemption will likely be defined, therefore, by the
thoroughness of federal agency assessment of “lawful specific
regulations” and not on hindsight case specific evaluations.
So where does that leave us? Trying to make sense of
preemption opinions reminds one of being on a roller coaster and, while
enjoying the ride, getting off is a welcome relief. The uncertainty of
where the coaster will go, while exhilarating for the time, is also
exhausting and frustrating. This coaster ride is over for the time being
though much work is left to be done after Wyeth in deciphering labeling
approval decisions to identify those that may preempt state tort claims.
134

Id. at 1201. The Court discussed the FDA’s 2006 drug regulation preamble in which
the preemption position was most recently articulated and found it did not deserve deference under
an assessment of its “thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness.” Id.
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Id. at 1202-03.
136
Id.
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Id. at 1203.
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Id. at 1204 (Breyer, J. concurring).
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Two cases were remanded by the Court for further ruling in light of
Wyeth140 and many others are likely to be reconsidered in its wake. For
the time being, it is important to point out that under Geier and Wyeth
opportunities remain to argue for implied preemption in the
pharmaceutical labeling context, and under other regulatory regimes.
Building on this assessment of the current, uncertain state of the
doctrine of preemption, this Article will now identify some of the
normative concerns that counsel against endorsing preemption doctrine
in the current preemption climate. First, the Court’s express preemption
doctrine continues to raise questions about the defining congressional
intent to preempt. After Riegel’s diatribe against tort law as implemented
by juries, preemption doctrine would have been fairly criticized as being
more concerned about reducing the role that tort law will play in the
world of regulated products than about fairly assessing congressional
intent to preempt. Whether the historic respect for the role of a robust
state tort law in enhancing product safety continues or not remains an
important open question in express preemption cases. Bates and Riegel
provide inconsistent answers, but they at least openly engage the debate.
I am in the camp of those who believe that state tort law has an
important role to play in regulating product safety and that it does not
create perverse incentives in doing so. Tort law is not of a piece and the
Court’s suggestion to the contrary in Riegel dismisses the reality that the
measured evolution of tort doctrines has already incorporated many
limits to address its alleged excesses. Many states have adopted
regulatory compliance defenses,141 causation-limiting doctrines and
apportionment mechanisms,142 limits on non-economic damages,143 and
other doctrines that limit the potential for excess liability. It also bears
repeating, as the Court noted in Wyeth, that tort law fundamentally serves
goals other than regulating conduct: compensation, enhancing the
availability of risk information, and corrective justice concerns are also
fundamental to tort law.144 These important objectives should not be
blithely ignored.
Second, as confirmed in Wyeth, the presence of a parallel tort
law regime fulfills the constant and critical need for oversight of the
140

Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., No. 08-437, 2009 WL 578682 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2009); Pa.
Employees Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, No. 07-822 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2009).
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See generally Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining
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Compliance Reconsidered, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1025-27 (2008).
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See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. (2000)
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See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 384 (2000).
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See generally John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L. J. 513
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regulatory process.145 Many have expressed the concern that our federal
agencies are simply ill-equipped to act as the “one-stop shop” for
insuring product safety.146 One need only look at the failures of weak
regulatory regimes in recent months to recognize the value of shining a
light on the dark recesses of our regulatory systems. Those recesses
result from a host of problems in the way our federal agencies operate:
from a lack of staffing and funding to insure regulatory compliance to an
inability to produce complete risk information (either pre- or postregulatory decision-making) because the regulated industry is largely in
charge of that information, to the influence of shifting political winds on
agency positions.147 These are concerns that stem from the inherent limits
of the regulatory process. While faith in the expertise and good judgment
of our regulators is certainly justified, that faith should not be blinded by
the limitations that the process imposes on them.
Finally, as a policy matter, a choice has to be made about where
the risk of uncertainty in the regulatory decision-making process should
be placed: on the future victim of that uncertainty or the creator of it.
Reasonable, rational, good faith decisions will be made that will produce
real and significant harms alongside the benefits of those decisions.
Inherent uncertainty exists in the current regulatory system because of,
among other things, information-gathering and enforcement limitations.
That uncertainty may or may not produce unreasonable risks from
conduct that leads to common law products liability. If it does, however,
the traditional tort system should not be prohibited from operating in its
traditional way without the unquestionably clear intent of our federal
legislators and regulators that such a result was, in fact, consciously
considered, contemplated, and desired.
Much has been written on the effect of limitations on
information gathering, and that ignoring those limitations can lead to
analyses that “diverge in significant ways from reality.”148 Questions
about the character of scientific knowledge and its relationship to the law
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abound.149 Scientific certainty and legal certainty are often in conflict; it
has been said that “[s]cience aims at truth without ever being certain.”150
Regulatory action based on scientific inquiry suffers from the same
problem. The limits of human knowledge belie the certainty with which
the Court tends to view regulatory action. The tort system places the risk
of uncertainty on the creator of that risk, providing a necessary incentive
for regulated industries to reduce reasonably the risk of uncertainty by
understanding, acknowledging, managing, and disclosing that risk.
Many scholars have weighed in recently on the debate over
whether tort law or administrative law should govern the risk inherent in
the discovery of products and processes that benefit a large percentage of
the population but, nevertheless, have inherent risks that will inevitably
burden a smaller percentage of that population.151 These discussions
include a variety of institutional comparisons and competency
assessments, noting the differing goals served by the different regimes
including uniformity, application of technical expertise, the viability of
optimal safety regulation, the desirability of compensatory remedies and
the need for oversight and accountability, among others. This larger
debate over the role of federal agency regulatory action as it relates to
traditional, state law-based private rights and responsibilities must
continue. The Court’s preemption doctrine is only one part of this debate.
The evolution of preemption doctrine since Cipollone in 1992 is
marked by aggressive efforts to expand its applicability to limit the
operation of tort laws and to further the reach of uniform federal
regulation. The relentless pursuit of preemption in the last two decades
strikes me more as an effort to overcome dissatisfaction with the tort
liability system than a sincere attempt at discerning congressional intent
under a particular legislative scheme. The object of modern preemption
doctrine seems to vacillate between discerning the scope of
congressional intent, and creating it.
No Congress writing in the last seventy years can rationally be
found to have intended to displace the central role that common law tort
doctrines have held in the goal of enhancing public safety yet such
arguments are often made. If state product liability and tort doctrines are
to be re-evaluated because of the perceived limitations they place on
149
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innovation or some generalized notion of societal welfare, expanding
preemption doctrine is not the way to accomplish it. That debate should
be held in the full light of day and not hidden behind the cloud of
preemption.
Preemption doctrine is out of balance, uncertain, and unwieldy in
application. Though the result in Wyeth is consistent with my own
position on the application of implied preemption doctrine to
pharmaceutical labeling cases,152 many questions remain about implied
preemption analysis generally. Now is certainly not the time to restate
products liability preemption; perhaps by the time we have a Restatement
(Fourth) of Products Liability.
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